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defendant, the burden should be on him to bring out those facts that
tend to negate the presence of the guilty mind which is necessary to
convict. The presumption of consciousness deduced from the doing of
the proscribed act is controlling, and the defendant should show and
prove that at the time the act was committed, he was not conscious and
thus did not possess the intent requisite to the crime. Finally, in view of
the consequences of a plea of unconsciousness-acquittal and outright
release-the decision rightly embodies the judicial dislike for the de-
fense that has been categorized as "the refuge of guilty minds." Thus,
by making automatism an affirmative defense with burden of satisfac-
tion on the defendant, the court is simply hoping to close off an avenue
of outright release for the guilty defendant. In the long run, however,
the problems raised by this defense cannot be solved in one case; there-
fore it remains the job of the General Assembly to awaken from its own
automatous state and to clear the confusion surrounding the defense of
unconsciousness."'
JAMES M. ISEMAN, JR.
Criminal Procedure-North Carolina Rejects a Retroactive
Application of Mullaney
Homicide defendants in North Carolina who asserted that they had
acted in self-defense or in the heat of passion upon sudden provocation
were long required to "satisfy the jury" of the truth of their assertions.'
61. Several variances on the theme and solutions to the problems have been
proposed. See State v. Sikora, 44 NJ. 453, 210 A.2d 193 (1965) (in which an expert
witness psychiatrist proposed that the mens rea element be abolished because, in his
opinion, the "conscious is always the unwitting and unsuspecting puppet of the uncon-
scious." Id. at 458, 210 A.2d at 198); Beck, supra note 49 (in which Beck proposes that
the fault lies in a criminal code giving outright acquittal and that the legislature should
require some sort of compulsory treatment after the trial if an automatism defense is
asserted); Fingarette, Diminished Mental Capacity as a Criminal Law Defense, 37 Mou-
ERN L. REv. 264 (1974) (in which the author says that the defense of automatism is not
unconsciousness but is an "altered state" of conscious action where defendant has lost
"rational control of his conduct" and that the confusion can be alleviated by treating the
defense as such.); and Sullivan, supra note 49 (in which he suggests that a solution lies in
making the unconscious defendant criminally negligent if he had a previous history of
black-outs and the jury found that a reasonable man would have anticipated the
unconscious state which occurred).
1. State v. Barnett, 132 N.C. 1005, 43 S.E. 832 (1903). See also State v.
Freeman, 275 N.C. 662, 170 S.E.2d 461 (1969); State v. Miller, 112 N.C. 878, 17 S.E.
167 (1893); State v. Ellick, 60 N.C. 450 (1864).
1020 [Vol. 54
BURDEN OF PROOF
But in Mullaney v. Wilbur the United States Supreme Court held that
the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a criminal defend-
ant did not act in the heat of passion upon sudden provocation when
that issue is presented.2 The North Carolina Supreme Court, in State
v. Hankerson, concluded that the Mullaney standard of proof also
applied to homicide defendants who raised the issue of self-defense, 3 but
the court declined to give retroactive effect to the new Mullaney rule.4
In Hankerson the court used a balancing test that the United States
Supreme Court has sometimes employed in deciding the retroactivity of
a new constitutional doctrine.5 This test involves balancing three fac-
tors: the purpose to be served by the new rule, reliance by enforcement
officials on previous decisions inconsistent with the new doctrine, and
the potential impact of retroactive application of the new doctrine on the
administration of justice. In applying the balancing formula, the North
Carolina court found that the purpose of the Mullaney rule was to
provide for a more "reliable" determination of innocence or of the
degree of guilt.8 Against this concededly important purpose the
court balanced the two other factors. It found that North Carolina and
other states had justifiably relied on an earlier Supreme Court pro-
nouncement in Leland v. Oregon that states could constitlutionally place
the burden of persuasion on defendants, at least for the affirmative
defense of insanity.7 Giving Mullaney retroactive application also
raised the specter of a tremendous burden on the administration of
justice in North Carolina.8 After balancing these interests, the court
concluded that the burden on judicial administration and prior justified
reliance were sufficient to outweigh the possibility that the fact-finding
process had been tainted by the pre-Mullaney standaqd and, thus, that
Mullaney should not apply retroactively.9
During the last two decades, the United States Supreme Court has
The burden also rested, and may still rest, on defendants to prove such matters as
intoxication, State v. Marsh, 234 N.C. 101, 66 S.E.2d 684 (1951), and insamty, State v.
Creech, 229 N.C. 662, 51 S.E.2d 348 (1949). The North Carolina Supreme Court has
indicated that Mullaney does not affect the burden for the insanity issue. State v.
Shepherd, 288 N.C. 346, 351, 218 S.E.2d 176, 179 (1975).
2. 421 U.S. 684, 704 (1975).
3. 288 N.C. 632, 220 S.E.2d 575 (1975).
4. Id. at 652, 220 S.E.2d at 589.
5. See text accompanying notes 12-14 infra.
6. 288 N.C. at 655, 220 S.E.2d at 591-92.
7. 343 U.S. 790 (1952) (holding that a state could require a defendant to prove
himself sane beyond a reasonable doubt).
8. 288 N.C. at 654-55, 220 S.E.2d at 591.
9. Id. at 652, 220 S.E.2d at 589.
10211976]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
used the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to revolution-
ize criminal procedure in state courts.10 Because some of the Court's
decisions during this period were unforeseeable and also because some
decisions required procedures fundamentally different from those pre-
viously used, the Court has on occasion held that a new rule is to be ap-
plied prospectively only.'" Thus, the Court has sometimes avoided un-
fairness to states, which had relied on previous constitutional doctrine,
by refusing to require them to choose between "emptying the jails" and
investing enormous amounts of time and resources in retrials.
The Court has established two lines of analysis in holding new
constitutional doctrine either fully retroactive or merely prospective. One
line'2 states that new rules intended primarily to insure an accurate
determination of facts are automatically to be enforced retroactively:
Where the major purpose of new constitutional doctrine is to
overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs
its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the
accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials, the new rule has been
given complete retroactive effect. Neither good-faith reliance by
state or federal authorities on prior constitutional law or accepted
practice, nor severe impact on the administration of justice has suf-
ficed to require prospective application in these circumstances.' 3
Conversely, if the major purpose of the new doctrine is perceived not to
be to enhance the judicial truth-finding function, retroactivity is typical-
ly denied.' 4
In a second line of analysis, the Court does not consider the
purpose of the new rule dispositive. Rather, a balancing test is used to
examine the probability that past trials have resulted in inaccurate guilty
verdicts.' 5 Using this balancing approach "[t]he question whether a
constitutional rule of criminal procedure does or does not enhance the
reliability of the fact-finding process at trial is necessarily a matter of
10. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
11. See, e.g., cases cited notes 16-18 infra. It may be that the Court would have
been less willing to extend notions of due process had all of its rulings been automatical-
ly retroactive.
12. Hereinafter referred to as the "automatically retroactive" cases.
13. Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971) (dictum) (plurality
opinion) (footnote omitted). See also Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203
(1972) (per curiam); Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 (1968) (per curiam).
14. See, e.g., Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968) (per curiam); Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
15. See, e.g., Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 31 (1975) (per curiam); Adams v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 (1972); DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968) (per curiam).
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degree."1 6 The Court reasons that the old rule may not have been the
cause of a guilty verdict: it rejects "the premise that every criminal trial,
or any particular trial, was necessarily unfair because it was not conduct-
ed in accordance with what we determined to be the requirements of [the
Constitution]."" In this line of cases the Court considers the question
whether the old rule infected the fact-finding process as a "question of
probabilities ' 18 and thus avoids the "automatically retroactive" line of
analysis. Once this analysis is chosen the Court uses a "balancing
approach,"' 9 weighing three factors: "(a) the purpose to be served by
the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement
authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administra-
tion of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards. 20
The Court has been inconsistent in deciding which test to apply.
For rules intended primarily and perhaps solely to insure a more just
determination of facts, the Court has sometimes invoked the "matter of
degree" formula rather than the ostensibly more appropriate "automati-
cally retroactive" analysis. Such was the case in DeStefano v. Woods2 '
in which the Court held nonretroactive the Duncan v. Louisiana&2 rule,
which incorporated the right to a jury trial for serious criminal offenses.
DeStefano also made Bloom v. Illinois,23 which required a right to jury
trial for serious criminal contempts, valid prospectively only. The
rationale for holding a new rule which changes the trier of fact retroac-
tive must be that a different fact-finder might arrive at a more just
result.24  In denying retroactivity, the Court assumed that many trials
by judges were as fair as if tried by juries, and concluded that since the
results might have been identical, an analysis of the other factors affect-
ing retroactivity was in order.2 5 On the other hand, the Court has
ignored the "matter of degree" formula in other cases where the trier of
16. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728-29 (1966) (holding Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), non-retroactive).
17. Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 3.1, 32 (1975) (per curiam) (holding Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), barring the exclusion of females from petit juries, non-
retroactive).
18. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729 (1966).
19. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 199 (1973).
20. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967). In this line of cases, "the purpose
to be served by the new constitutional rule" will not automatically decide retroactivity,
but is merely "[floremost among these factors." Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244,
249 (1969).
21. 392 U.S. 631 (1968) (per curiam).
22. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
23. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
24. 391 U.S. at 158.
25. 392 U.S. at 633-34.
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fact might or might not have reached a different result had the new
standard been in force. In Ivan V. v. City of New York, 20 for example,
the Court noted an obvious fact-finding purpose for the substitution of
the reasonable doubt standard for a preponderance of the evidence test.
Consequently, the Court disposed of the matter with a recital of the
"automatically retroactive" line of cases. Such inconsistencies provoked
one commentator to conclude that the Court may be "basing its deci-
sions on a pragmatic political assessment of the consequences. 27
When the Court uses the balancing approach, it finds that the
factors of reliance and burden on judicial administration work together
against retroactivity. The reliance factor often seems merely a make-
weight argument. In Daniel v. Louisiana,28 for instance, the Court's
refusal to hold its ban on sexually exclusive juries29 retroactive was
probably based almost exclusively on the potentially staggering impact
on the administration of justice of retroactive application of the rule (at
least in Louisiana). The Court emphasized, however, that Louisiana
had been entitled to rely on a fourteen-year-old decision finding such
procedure constitutional." Similarly, when the potential burden on
judicial administration seems minor, the Court may claim that reliance
on prior inconsistent rules was unjustified because a recent case "clearly
foreshadowed . . . [or] preordained" the overruling of prior law and
thus the advent of the new constitutional doctrine.3' The relative
insignificance of this reliance factor is illustrated by the fact that retroac-
tivity has never been limited by the Court to the time when the new rule
was "foreshadowed. 32
26. 407 U.S. 203 (1972) (per curiam) (holding In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970), retroactive).
27. Ostrager, Retroactivity and Prospectivity of Supreme Court Constitutional
Interpretations, 19 N.Y.L.F. 289, 307 (1973).
An additional factor that the Court weighs is the availability of post-conviction
remedies for unfairness if the new doctrine is made prospective only. See, e.g., Stovall V.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 299 (1967).
28. 420 U.S. 31 (1975) (per curiam).
29. Articulated in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 512 (1975).
30. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
31. Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969) (per curiam). The Court held
the rule in Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), that a state must make a good faith
effort to bring in a missing witness, retroactive. The Court reasoned that Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), which incorporated the sixth amendment's right of
confrontation into the fourteenth, made the Barber rule follow. But Pointer overruled a
series of cases from West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 264 (1904), to Stein v. New York,
346 U.S. 156, 195-96 (1953), on which states were no doubt relying.
32. Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314 (1969), made Barber retroactive not just to
the time at which Pointer was decided, but for all time. See Ostrager, supra note 27, at
294-95.
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The Court is also hesitant to put great burdens on any state's
judicial administration. The prospect of numerous retrials in any state
weighs against retroactivity, even if such retrials would be necessary in
only a small minority of states. 3 Retroactivity under these circum-
stances would impose an enormous burden on those states, since wit-
nesses and evidence that a state had presented at the first trial might no
longer be available."4 The Court's analysis of this potential impact of
retroactivity on the judicial system has usually been non-quantitative,
because in few instances will a state's records indicate in how many
cases a formerly constitutional procedure was followed.35 In rare in-
stances, however, the Court is able to use statistics to evaluate the havoc
that retroactivity might wreak. For example, in Wolff v. McDonnell the
Court refused to require the expunction of facts in prison. records that
had been determined without such minimum standards of due process as
the rights to see written notice of charges and to be furnished a written
statement of the evidence relied on.3 6 The Court in Wolff identified the
burden on prison administration quantitatively: misconduct hearings in
the federal system alone were proceeding at the rate of 19,000 per year
in 1973. 3 Reasoning that it had earlier held other due process stan-
dards non-retroactive for parole revocation proceedings for which the
federal government had held only 1,173 hearings in 1973,38 the Court
concluded that non-retroactivity should obtain in Wolff "a fortiori."3 9
In other cases the Court's quantitative analysis of the impact of
retroactivity on the administration of justice has been less sophisticated.
For instance, in Halliday v. United States, the Court refused to make
retroactive the rule that a guilty plea is invalid if the judge who accepted
it failed to comply with the applicable Federal Rule.4 0  The Court noted
that "over 85% of all convictions in the federal courts are obtained
However, limitation of retroactivity to the point where the new rule became
preordained would seem a good result where the other two factors are hi close balance.
33. See, e.g., Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 31 (1975) (per curiam); Tehan v.
Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 418 (1966).
34. 382 U.S. at 418-19.
35. See, e.g., DIVISION OF CRIMINAL LAw AND ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF
JuscE, STATE OF CALIFoRNIA, CRIME IN CALiFoRNrA (1962); NORTH CAROLINA DE.
PARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, STATE CORRECTIONs STATISTICAL ABsTRAcr (1974).
36. 418 U.S. 539, 563-65, 573-74 (1974).
37. Id. at 574. There was no estimate of the burden on state prisons.
38. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 490 (1972).
39. 418 U.S. at 574. The Court used the balancing approach although it admitted
that the new doctrine "related to the integrity of the fact-finding process." Id. at 573-74.
40. 394 U.S. 831 (1969) (per curiam). The doctrine held non-retroactive arose in
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), and referred to FED. R. CrM. P. 11.
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pursuant to guilty pleas."'" It failed, however, to explore how many of
those convictions would have been voided by giving retroactive effect to
the ruling. The percentage actually voided would have been far less
than the Court's figure because the new rule was "substantially a
restatement of existing law and practice."'42
At first glance the North Carolina decision in Hankerson, holding
Mullaney non-retroactive, seems to be a likely candidate for reversal in
the federal courts. Mullaney, which held that the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant did not act in the heat of
passion upon sudden provocation, relied heavily on In re Winship,
which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile proceed-
ings.4  Winship was held retroactive in Ivan V. v. City of New York,44
a fact that the Court noted in a footnote to Mullaney.46 On its face,
that footnote suggests that Mullaney might also require retroactive
application.46  The footnote's position, however, is a clue to its import-
ance: it appears in the middle of a sentence in which the Court re-
jected the lower court's refusal to extend the Winship requirement that
the State shoulder the burden of proof for all essential elements of a
crime to the defense of heat of passion upon sudden provocation. There-
fore, taken in context, the footnote seems designed to buttress the
Court's conclusion that the lower court in Mullaney had misinterpreted
Winship. Despite its decision that this footnote was not controlling on
the issue of retroactivity, the North Carolina Supreme Court recognized
41. 394U.S. at 833.
42. Id. at 834 (Harlan, J., concurring).
In Wolff, the Court may have assumed that practically none of the nation's prison
disciplinary proceedings comported with its requirements of due process before its ruling.
Given the affirmative nature of its requirements, such an assumption, although not
articulated, should be warranted.
43. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
44. 407 U.S. 203 (1972) (per curiam).
45. 421 U.S. at 688 n.8.
46. The per curiam decision in Ivan V. used the "automatically retroactive" test,
finding that the "major purpose" of the Winship rule "was to overcome an aspect of a
criminal trial that substantially impairs the truth-finding function." 407 U.S. at 205.
Thus, the Court failed to examine the other two factors which would have been weighed
in the balancing approach. However, its failure to invoke the balancing line of cases in
Ivan V. is not dispositive of the Hankerson situation. Two earlier cases that seem to
belong in one category were treated oppositely: the Court's use of the absolutist
approach in 1968 to hold the right to counsel at the imposition of a deferred sentence
retroactive, McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 (1968) (per curiam), did not preclude use of
the balancing approach in 1972 to hold the requirement of counsel at preliminary
hearing non-retroactive. Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 (1972). A shift in the make-
up of the Court may explain to some extent the recent rise of the balancing approach. At
any rate, the way that the Supreme Court decides to treat the purpose factor "seems
sometimes to depend on analysis of the other two factors." 288 N.C. at 653; 220 S.E.2d
at 590.
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the importance of distinguishing Ivan V. from Hankerson throughout its
analysis of retroactivity.47
In its analysis of whether to give retroactive effect to Mullaney, the
North Carolina Supreme Court employed the United States Supreme
Court's balancing approach. The North Carolina court was as unclear as
the United States Supreme Court in articulating why it chose to use the
balancing approach rather than the "automatically retroactive" line of
cases, since it conceded that "the purpose of the Mullaney rule [is] to
insure a reliable determination of the question of guilt. '48  The court
invoked the balancing test by calling the possibility of an inaccurate
verdict of guilty a "'question of probabilities."',4  However, the court
failed to examine what the probabilities of an incorrect determination
were, and, incidentally, lost an opportunity to distinguish Hankerson
from Ivan V.50  Prejudice by the finder of fact was less inherent in
Hankerson than. in Ivan V. Presumably all of the juvenile defendants
made eligibile for retrial in Ivan V. were tried before judges.51 Many if
not all homicide trials are before juries, as was the case in Hankerson.52
The complicated pre-Mullaney set of instructions in North Carolina 3
might well, as Justice Lake suggested in a concurring opinion in Hanker-
son, have resulted in harmless error.54 Unable to follow th, shifting bur-
den in the homicide instructions, the jury might well have heeded the
apparently overriding instruction to convict only if convinced of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.5 5 Unwilling to convict without proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, the jury might have refused to do so, thus nullifying
the instruction.55 An exhaustive study has shown that juries often
47. See, e.g., 288 N.C. at 654; 220 S.E.2d at 590. The court couches its distinction
of Hankerson from Ivan V. in terms of the differences between Mullaney and Winship.
48. Id. at 655, 220 S.E.2d at 591.
49. Id. at 655, 220 S.E.2d at 591-92.
50. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
51. See text accompanying note 64 infra.
52. See note 72 infra.
53. See 288 N.C. at 642-43, 220 S.E.2d at 583-84.
54. Id. at 659-60, 220 S.E.2d at 594. However, for a constitutional error to be
harmless "the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
55. Even in a simple case, "the average juror usually does not understand the rules
of law applicable to the case, or often is not able to apply them appropriately if he does
understand them." Gordon & Temerlin, Forensic Psychology: The Judge and the Jury,
52 JuIucATtRu 328, 332 (1969). In a sampling of over 300 jurors conducted by federal
judges, "[olver one-third reported not having understood the judge's'instructions; and an
unknown number. . . did not understand but did not say so." Id.
56. H. KALvBN & H. ZEIsEL, THE AMEPCAN JuRy, 182-90 (1966) (juries have a
higher standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" than do judges and are less likely to
convict).
It would be extremely interesting to compare conviction rates (when self-defense or
10271976]
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disregard the harshness of rules of law especially in judging self-defense
claims.57 The probability of misunderstanding or of nullification of the
pre-Mullaney instruction 'by a jury seems much higher than that of a
judge confusing the standards in pre-Winship cases. Thus, there seems
to be a lower probability that a defendant was wrongfully convicted in
the Mullaney situation than in the Winship situation.
Justice Exum's analysis of the reliance element of the Supreme
Court's balancing test is the strongest part of the court's opinion. He
distinguishes Hankerson from Ivan V. by noting that the reasonable
doubt standard required in Winship has long been an essential part of
criminal proceedings, with no exception ever made for juveniles. 58 Yet
an exception to the reasonable doubt standard for affirmative defenses
had been clearly carved out by the Supreme Court itself. In Leland v.
Oregon59 the Court held that placing the burden on defendant for an
insanity defense comported with due process. Before Mullaney, it was
"believed that there [was] no general federal constitutional barrier" to
shifting the burden on "affirmative defenses." 60 Consequently, the
reliance factor clearly militates in favor of non-retroactivity.
The North Carolina Supreme Court's analysis of the potential
burden of holding Mullaney retroactive on the administration of justice
in North Carolina and elsewhere is incomplete. The court failed to
explain why the impact of Winship's retroactivity on the administration
of justice in one state (New York) "would obviously be less than the
Mullaney rule which applies to all homicide cases."6 1 But explanation
heat of passion instructions were given) in states that formerly shifted those burdens to
defendants with conviction rates of states that always retained the burden.
57. In their classic work, THE AMERICAN JuRy, supra note 56, Kalven and Zeisel
conducted a study of cases in which judges disagreed with jury verdicts when self-defense
or provocation were issues. In each of the fifty-five disagreements studied, the judge
thought the law and the evidence required more severity (conviction rather than acquittal
or conviction of a more serious offense) than the verdict allowed. Id. at 239, 221-41
(Chapter 16, the Boundaries of Self-Defense). In their study of 1063 disagreements of
all kinds between judge and jury, in 143 of the cases, or thirteen percent, the judge
thought the law and the evidence required less severity than the verdict reflected. Id. at
110. The authors concluded that "[Wn the end the jury protest reflected in this long
sequence of cases speaks for itself: an impatience with the nicety of the law's boundaries
hedging the privilege of self-defense." Id. at 240-41. Nine years before Mullaney, the
authors found that "[iln many ways the jury is the law's most interesting critic." Id. at
219.
58. 288 N.C. at 654,220 S.E.2d at 590-91.
59. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
60. E. CLFARY & J. STRONG, EVIDENCE-CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 118 (2d ed.
1975).
However, Mullaney did not overrule Leland directly. Cf. Tehan v. Shott 382 U.S.
406, 417-18 (1966).
61. 288 N.C. at 654; 220 S.E.2d at 591.
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is possible. First, many of the juveniles who suffered from improper
trials before Winship must have been released before Ivan V. was
decided two yeais later because the typical length of stay in New York's
juvenile correctional facilities in fiscal 1971 was under one year.6 There
is obviously much less turnover among those convicted of murder and
manslaughter. 63 Secondly, since there is no right to jury trial in juvenile
proceedings,6 4 the burden on New York in Ivan V. was further reduced;
expensive and time-consuming jury trials were not required of the state.
In considering the potential burden on the administration of justice
in North Carolina, the court could have used a more complete quantita-
tive analysis. The court identified 997 persons then incarcerated for
first and second degree murder as potential beneficiaries of Mutlaney
retroactivity in North Carolina.65 That figure is both underinclusive
and overinclusive. Only those convicted murderers who did not plead
guilty and who satisfied the burden of coming forward with a self-
defense or a heat of passion defense should be eligibile for retrial.66
Perhaps only fifteen percent of the 997 convicted murderers would meet
this test of eligibility for retrial.6 On the other hand, the court failed to
62. There were 3489 admissions to and 3483 discharges from juvenile facilities in
New York in fiscal 1971. The total juvenile population in New York's juvenile facilities
was 2682 as of June 30, 1971. M. HiNDELANG, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JusTicE, LAW
ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION
AND STATISTICS SERVICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATIStrcs-1974, Tables
6.4 (at 418), 6.7 (at 421), 6.10 (at 423).
63. The typical length of incarceration for assault (see text accompanying notes
71-72 infra) must also be substantial. For example, the penalty for assault in Pennsyl-
vania can reach ten years, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1103(2), 2702 (1973), and
occasionally twenty years, id. tit. 18, §§ 1103(1), 2502, 2704 (1973, Spec. Pamphlet
1975).
64. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
65. 288 N.C. at 654, 220 S.E.2d at 591.
66. Those who pleaded guilty should not be allowed to raise such a defense now.
Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
WVhere evidence and witnesses have disappeared and memories have faded, the State
would have no record upon which to base its case. Many convicted murderers would
win their freedom by now putting the State to its proof.
If a defendant did not meet the burden of going forward with a self-defense or heat
of passion defense at trial, he either did not have one to present then or was wrongfully
determined not to have met the initial burden. In the former case, justice and good
sense should preclude his raising the defense at a later date. In the latter case, if he has
failed to use available appellate remedies for the wrongful determination, holding
Mullaney retroactive should not change his situation.
67. With the cooperation of the North Carolina Department of Corrections, I
sampled, at random, the records of 207 murderers convicted before Mullaney. Each file
contained a "Crime Story-Inmate's Version" as well as an indication of whether the
inmate pled guilty or was tried. My purpose was to determine in how many cases a self-
defense or heat of passion upon sudden provocation instruction would have been required
under North Carolina law. In the self-defense category are those-inmates who indicated
that they thought it necessary to kill in order to save themselves from death or great
1976] 1029
1030 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54
note that untold numbers of the 695 prisoners convicted of man-
slaughter who pleaded self-defense would also be potential benefi-
ciaries. 8 In addition, many parolees might willingly seize upon an
opportunity to have their cases retried and to establish their innocence."9
But the burden on the North Carolina courts would be less than
that on those of some other jurisdictions. Justice Exum lists fourteen
jurisdictions that required homicide defendants to carry the burden of
persuasion for self-defense or heat of passion. 0 Two of those fourteen,
Olri- and Pennsylvania, and three others not included in the fourteen,
bodily harm, and who claimed that they were without fault in bringing about the
altercation. See State v. Smith, 268 N.C. 659, 151 S.E.2d 596 (1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 1032 (1967). 4 J. STRONG, N.C. INDEx Homicide, § 9 (1968). In the heat of
passion upon sudden provocation category are defendants who claimed that they were
struck or assaulted by the victims immediately prior to the killing, but who did not claim
fear of death or great bodily harm. See State v. McLawhorn, 270 N.C. 622, 155 S.E.2d
198 (1967). Other legal provocations such as sexual act with a female relative and
defense of one's habitation or place of business are recognized in North Carolina, id. at
628-29, 155 S.E.2d at 203, but no inmate claimed that he killed because of them. It
should be noted that the "Crime Story-Inmate's Version" may not necessarily corre-
spond to what defendant claimed at trial.
The primary explanations I found were:
First degree Second degree
murder murder
Number of files examined 100 107
Number that pled guilty or
nolo contendere 37 83
Explanations of inmates pleading not guilty
Self-defense 9 11
Heat of passion upon sudden provocation 7 4
Did not commit crime 17 4
Intoxicated (alcohol or drugs) 12 0
Accident during felony 8 0
Don't remember 2 2
Insane 1 0
Guilty-law prevented guilty plea 4 0
Fifth Amendment 3 1
Child beating 0 2
68. These prisoners should be eligible for retrial only if they received a self-defense
instruction at trial. See note 66 supra. A substantial number of those imprisoned for
manslaughter (695 at the end of 1974, N.C. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 35, at
29) may well be eligible for retrial. To be convicted of voluntary manslaughter in
North Carolina, one must prevail upon a heat of passion defense, or be adjudged to have
used excessive force in defending one's self. 4 J. STRONG, supra note 67, at § 6; see State
v. Watson, 222 N.C. 672, 24 S.E.2d 540 (1943); State v. Mosely, 213 N.C. 304, 195 S.E.
830 (1938). In the latter, the relevant situation, the burden was on defendant to show
that his use of force was reasonable. State v. McDonald, 249 N.C. 419, 106 S.E.2d 477
(1959). Were Mullaney retroactive, those inmates who claimed reasonable force would
be entitled to retrials. See State v. Calloway, 1 N.C. App. 150, 160 S.E.2d 501 (1968)
(erroneous instruction about intensity of proof on justification not cured by manslaughter
verdict, because defendant's self-defense plea could have resulted in acquittal).
69. The number of murderers and manslayers on parole is unknown.
70. 288 N.C. at 654-55; 220 S.E.2d at 591.
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Illinois, Kentucky, and Missouri, put the burden on defendants for one
or both issues in assault cases.7 1  The number of persons who would
benefit from retroactive application of Mullaney in Ohio and Pennsyl-
vania might be significantly higher than in North Carolina, which has
never shifted the burden in assault cases. 72 Furthermore, if the Mulla-
ney principle is to be extended to other affirmative defenses, other states
might face retrial of substantial numbers of convicted felons.7"
If Mullaney were made retroactive, however, and if only prisoners
who had not pleaded guilty and who had sustained their burden of
producing evidence on issues of self-defense or heat of passion were
permitted retrials, the position of the states affected would not be
impossible. Retrials for that limited class of prisoners would not impose
on the states some of the burdens normally associated with retrials.71
The disappearance of evidence and witnesses and the fading of witness-
es' memories should not unduly prejudice the State. Normally, in order
to meet his burden of production in the original trial, the defendant
71. Shepherd v. Commonwealth, 306 Ky. 121, 206 S.W.2d 485 (1947); Davis v.
State, 237 Md. 97, 205 A.2d 254 (1964); State v. Davis, 342 Mo. 594, 116 S.W.2d 110
(1938); State v. Powers, 98 Ohio App. 365, 129 N.E.2d 653, appeal dismissed, 162 Ohio
St. 431, 123 N.E.2d 406 (1954); Commonwealth v. Yancer, 125 Pa. Super. 352, 189 A.
684 (1937), cited with approval, Commonwealth v. Noble, 371 Pa. 138, 88 A.2d 762
(1952). See generally 6A CJ.S. Assault & Battery § 115 (1975).
72. The North Carolina rule of placing the burden on defendants in homicide cases
but not in assault cases was a rational one. When defense lawyers seek to "tiry the
victim wherever possible," Katz, Defense of a Homicide Case, 1 NXt'L J. OF CRIM.
DEFENSE, 235, 248 (1975), and when defendant is shown beyond a reasonable doubt to
have eliminated any possible rebuttal by the victim, there is a reason for making
defendant explain which does not exist in the assault situation. See note 66 supra.
However, fewer persons were in North Carolina prisons for non-sexual assault
(728) than for homicide (1661) at the end of 1974. N.C. DEPT. OF COnancrIONS,
supra note 35, at 29. On the other hand, if the incorrect placement of the burden of
proof had a significant effect, the ratio of convicted assaulters might well be higher in
the jurisdictions using the improper standard.
Furthermore, there would be administrative difficulty in states that allow felony
trials without a jury. North Carolina does not permit waiver of jury trial except for
petty misdemeanors. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 24; State v. Hill, 209 N.C. 53, 182 S.E. 716
(1935); State v. Holt, 90 N.C. 749 (1884). In other states, if there were no instruction
on heat of passion or self-defense, the courts would have to determine from perhaps
sketchy records whether such a defense was properly raised from all the evidence.
73. Mullaney could conceivably be extended to reach numerous affirmative de-
fenses on which some defendants have borne the burden of persuasion, including
insanity, duress, intoxication, and entrapment. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, CRMINAL
LAw 46-51 (1972). But cf. State v. Shepherd, 288 N.C. 346, 351, 218 S.E.2d 176, 179
(1975) (Mullaney does not apply to insanity).
74. There appears to be little precedent for a criminal retrial limited to only certain
questions. Cf. Brown v. United States, 483 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1973) (remand to review
record to determine whether invalid prior convictions affected prisoner's sentence).
Arguably, however, such a procedure would seem ideal were Mullaney to be held
retroactive. No relitigation of the fact that defendant committed the homicide or assault
should be permitted. That fact has been properly proved, beyond a reasonable doubt.
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himself testified about the act. That testimony, when introduced at
retrial,7 5 should serve practically to preclude assertion of a defense that
the defendant did not commit the act. Thus, the issue will normally be
only the existence of a self-defense or heat of passion defense.76 Those
are questions about the defendant's state of mind and the reasonableness
of that state of mind at the time of the alleged crime. The re-creation
of the circumstances by other witnesses will be secondary; the credibility
of the defendant will be central to determination of the issue.77 That
practical limitation on the issues to be resolved will normally make the
burden on the states one of time and expense only. Because the State is
not likely to dismiss cases of convicted murderers, grossly incorrect
results should be exceptional.7
The considerations in Hankerson are fairly evenly balanced. The
burden on the administration of justice would be substantial, but at least
in North Carolina, not catastrophic unless Mullaney is extended. Reli-
ance on Leland, which allowed the State to shift the burden of persua-
sion on the affirmative defense of insanity,70 seemed to justify the
75. It would be admissible. 21 AM. JuR. 2d Criminal Law § 357 (1965); 22A
C.LS. Criminal Law § 733 (1961).
76. There remains the rare situation when defendant's burden was met by evidence
other than his own testimony. In that situation, the State may well be harmed by retrial.
But normally, the record of the State's evidence, combined with that of the evidence that
defendant produced, should be sufficient to convince the jury that defendant committed
the act, so that practically the only questions raised will be those on which the defendant
wrongly bore the burden of persuasion.
77. In an assault retrial, the State's case is more likely to be severely prejudiced if
the victim has disappeared or died than in a homicide retrial. In the typical assault trial,
there is a contest of credibility between the accused and the victim. In the homicide
situation, there may or may not be witnesses who actually saw the event.
78. Paradoxically, since the State will presumably fail to retry few defendants, the
burden in terms of time and expense will be even more extensive.
79. This Notes analysis makes the decision in State v. Shepherd, 288 N.C. 346,
218 S.E.2d 176 (1975), which held that Mullaney does not apply to the affirmative
defense of insanity, seem unwise. Hankerson seems correct only if (1) the shift in the
burden of proof mandated by Mullaney is merely of minor importance, and (2) the
retrials of prisoners create serious problems for the State. Shepherd's insistence that the
burden remain with the defendant for an insanity defense seems to belie the first
contention. Furthermore, the Shepherd result creates a serious risk of many retrials. It
seems far from clear that Shepherd will survive Supreme Court scrutiny. See The
Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARv. I.. REv. 1, 53 (1975). If the Court reverses
Shepherd, it will have to decide whether to make that extension of Mullaney retroactive.
Like the Hankerson question, the question of the retroactivity of future extensions of
Mullaney seems to admit of no easy answer. Therefore, prisoners who raise insanity
defenses at post-Mullaney trials may well gain new trials because of a future Supreme
Court decision.
The decision in Shepherd is understandable, however, given that once courts extend
the concept of due process, they rarely renege on the extension. See text accompanying
note 10 supra. As a stop-gap procedure, until the appeals in Shepherd are exhausted,
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court's decision to hold Mullaney non-retroactive. Although the Mul-
laney rule does relate to truth-finding, the probability in most cases that
facts were wrongfully found at trial may be quite low.
Although it is a close question, the decision in Hankerson seems
correct. The benefits of the more equitable rule of Mullaney for future
defendants should not be outweighed by the costs of its retroactive
application. For the last two decades the United States Supreme Court
has been seeking to refine American criminal procedure. Mullaney
represents a technical readjustment, a proper refinement. Frequent
relitigation does not serve the Supreme Court's goal. Retrials cost
money and take time; they result in incorrect verdicts because evidence
and witnesses are missing; they make prosecutors spread themselves too
thinly. Most importantly, they tend to diminish the confidence of the
public in the judicial process. The citizenry can quickly grasp the fact
that a trial without a lawyer may have been unfair, but it will have more
trouble finding that a person who has been fairly proved beyond a
reasonable doubt to have killed another was unfairly tried because he
had to show that he was provoked and angered or that his life was
threatened.80
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North Carolina prosecutors might voluntarily request a misstatement of the law in jury
instructions on the affirmative defense of insanity: they could request a charge making
the State prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. If conviction resulted, that instruction
would seem harmless to defendant. Then, the verdict would be unassailable in future
years. This procedure, if not uniform, might be subject to equal protection challenge.
80. In other jurisdictions, the question of Mullaney's retroactivity is closer than in
North Carolina. Had the North Carolina court held Mullaney retroactive, the most
important interest, life itself, would be protected, since some convicted murderers in
North Carolina face the death penalty. State v. Fowler, 285 N.C. 90, 203 S.E.2d 803,
cert. granted, 419 U.S. 963 (1974). Ivan V. protected liberty only. Although the due
process clause does not establish a hierarchy among the protected interests of "life,
liberty, [and] property," the United States Supreme Court seems unanxious to affirm
death sentences even for persons properly convicted. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972). It is important to consider that some North Carolina prisoners face execution
after trials that would not presently pass constitutional scrutiny. Yet the United States
Supreme Court has always given special consideration to those states whose procedures
most grievously offended due process in deciding retroactivity. See text accompanying
note 33 supra. Although the burden on the administration of justice might vary
substantially among states, a retroactivity decision would apply equally to all. Al-
though the burden may not be great in North Carolina, other states face a more
substantial burden. Therefore, the Hankerson result should ultimately prevail in the
United States Supreme Court.
Perhaps a better procedure would be to let each state arrive at its own balance,
articulating the factors, balanced, with an empirical determination of the potential
burden on the administration of justice. Results that the federal courts found offensive
to due process could be reversed.
